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Abstract
This paper describes how prediction markets can make
governments smarter, cheaper, and more responsive to changing
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law.
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conditions. A prediction market resembles a stock exchange where
traders buy and sell not shares of companies, but claims about various
future events. Academic and commercial use of prediction markets
indicates that they offer a useful tool for encouraging, collecting, and
quantifying widely scattered expertise. Government administratorshave
begun experimenting with prediction markets, too. Many questions
remain, however, about the proper way to implement government
prediction markets. This paperopens with a briefsurvey of the costs and
benefits of government prediction markets. It then turns to ironing out
the statutory and regulatory wrinkles occasioned by government
prediction markets in general, and by federal executive prediction
markets in particular. The paper begins by asking who should run
governmentprediction markets and who should trade on them. The short
answers: Government agencies should outsource the provision of
prediction markets and let employees and outside contractors trade on
them. The paper then turns to mitigating the legal risks raised by
government prediction markets-especially those offering cash or other
valuable consideration-and advocates such prophylactics as hosting
spot transactions in negotiable conditional notes, offering traders seed
funding, and contractually mandating a minimum level of trading. The
paper concludes by describing a three-step plan for putting prediction
markets to work for the United States government and, through it, the
People.

INTRODUCTION: TOWARD SMARTER GOVERNMENT

Good government requires good information. However, the United
States government too often relies on expensive and ineffectual
forecasting mechanisms. Consider the revolution that recently erupted in
Egypt: Despite having poured over $125 million into a computer model
designed to warn of political unrest, American military and intelligence
agencies evidently got caught flat-footed.' Our government can do
better. Prediction markets, because they collect and quantify relatively
accurate estimates about the likelihood of future events, offer a
promising solution to the problem of government ignorance. This paper
explains why prediction markets deserve a try, who should build,
manage, and trade on them, and how the U.S. federal government's
executive branch could constitutionally implement them.
1. Noah Shachtman, Pentagon's Prediction Software Didn't Spot Egypt Unrest,
11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/pentagonpredict-egypt-unrest/.
WIRED (February
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What are prediction markets? Not markets for predictions but
rather markets that make predictions. First, a very brief description of
prediction markets. In prediction markets, traders buy and sell notes
payable at $1/each if a specified claim about the future comes true. 2 As
with the instruments traded on securities or commodities futures markets,
the price of a claim on a prediction market tracks the consensus, among
traders with strong incentives to make accurate estimates, about present
value. 3 If a claim traded at close to its face value of $1/note, therefore,
the market would reveal a consensus among traders about the claim's
truth.'
Private enterprises have already put prediction markets to work in
forecasting printer sales, software development, and other applications.5
Field research of such uses suggests that, while hardly a magic crystal
ball, a well-designed prediction market can efficiently generate up-todate, unbiased numbers about the likelihood of future events.6 The
public sector, no less than the private one, could benefit from such a tool.
Indeed, government agencies have already begun experimenting
with prediction markets. In 2001, the Department of Defense's blue-sky
research agency, DARPA, planned to sponsor prediction markets on
questions of military interest, but scuttled the program for political
reasons before its launch.7 In 2009, the National Science Foundation
issued a grant to Wilson Center to set up prediction markets pertaining to
synthetic biology. 8 Most recently, and most relevant to this paper's
focus, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence launched a
program to explore how prediction markets can serve the federal

2. Other units or denominations would work too, of course; I use $1 by convention
and for simplicity.
3. For descriptions of prediction markets, see JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF
CROWDS 17-22 (2004); Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, J. EcoN.
PERSP., Spring 2004 at 107 (2004).
4. ROBIN HANSON, IMPLEMENTING COLLABORATIVE FORECASTING IN GOVERNMENT
(Science & Technology Policy Institute 2011) (forthcoming).
5. Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, A New Approach for Regulating Information
Markets, 29 J. REG. ECON. 265, 266 (2006).
6. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 103145 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
7. For more about the Policy Analysis Markets, see infra § 3.1.
8. Synthetic Biology Project Receives Two National Science Foundation Grants,
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY PROJECT (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.synbioproject.org/news/
project/6379/. This project has not yet evidently generated any results. National Science
Foundation, Award Abstract #0960533: Prediction Markets-An Experimental
Application to Synthetic Biology (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.nsfgov/awardsearch/
showAward.do?AwardNumber-0960533&version=noscript (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
It is not yet clear whether it will use play or real money.
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government. 9
Plainly, we can expect interesting days ahead for
government prediction markets.
Prediction markets offer administrators just one more among many
bureaucratic tools, one not fundamentally different from filing cabinets,
interoffice memos, or employee identification badges.
As such,
prediction markets might find use in any branch of federal or state
government. Judging from former and present experiments, however, as
well as for sound legal reasons, it looks most likely that we will see
government prediction markets used in the federal executive branch.10
A quick example can help to illustrate how a government agency
might put prediction markets to work. At present, the Department of
Defense (the "DoD") struggles to predict the cost of weapons
procurement programs. This proves especially unfortunate when, as
happens far too often, a program runs so far over budget that it triggers a
breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment to the 1982 Defense
Procurement Act, an outcome that entails considerable administrative
burdens and that may even lead to the program's cancellation.
Although the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment responds to a breach by
mandating updated and presumably more accurate estimates, that hardly
solves the problem of how to generate accurate estimates in the first
place. On that count, prediction markets might help.
The DoD might, for instance, set up a prediction market for the
claim, "The VXX Presidential Helicopter Program will trigger a NunnMcCurdy breach." The DoD would allow-or better yet require-that
government and contract employees working on the program trade on the
VXX breach claim.' 2 The employees would then use their first-hand
knowledge of the program to buy or sell virtual conditional notes worth
$1, or some play-money equivalent, if the claim were to come true.
Judging from the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Program, the failed
predecessor to the VXX program now proposed, another Nunn-McCurdy

9.

See Aggregative Contingent Estimation ProgramBroadAgency Announcement,
INTELLIGENCE (May
19, 2010),
OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
http://www.iarpa.gov/solicitations-ace.html. For a description of how they plan to use
prediction markets to meet ACE's goals, see Good Judgment Team, The Good Judgment
Team Invites You to a 2011 Prediction Tournament, http://surveys.crowdcast.com/s3/
ACERegistration (last visited March 9, 2011). Effectively, the Good Judgment Team
does not plan offer valuable consideration to reward good trades.
10. The president's obligations as Commander in Chief of the military, in particular,
make it both prudent and constitutional for the executive branch to employ prediction
markets. See U.S. CONST., Art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1.
11. 10 U.S.C.A. § 2433 (West 2011).
12. For more about why the DoD should requiretrading, see infra §§ 3.1, 4.2.
OFFICE
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breach looks all too likely.' 3 Suppose, then, that the VXX breach claim
traded at 820 per note. That price would reflect the current consensus,
among people most likely to know, about the probability that the VXX
program would suffer a Nunn-McCurdy breach. In particular, a price of
820 per note would equate to a forecast of an 82% chance of a breachalerting the program's managers and (not inconsequentially) their
superiors to a looming problem. Why? Because that would reveal
traders willing to pay 820 for a chance of winning $1 in the event of a
VXX breach. A drop in price would show that traders think breach less
likely, making the investment less valuable. A rise in price would signal
the opposite opinion, of course.
Even though many details remain unfilled in that quick sketch, it
reveals why a government agency might benefit from trying prediction
markets. By directly tapping the expertise of the sort of people, such as
engineers, production managers, or line workers, who have first-hand
knowledge of when a weapons procurement program faces a potential
cost overrun, a prediction market could give the DoD and other executive
branch agencies faster, cheaper, and more accurate estimates than current
methods. Program managers at the Department of Defense could spend
less time forecasting performance and more time actually performing.
Higher-ups could quickly drill down through layers of management to
get an update on the status of any particular weapon procurement
program; computers throughout the Executive Branch could host desktop
widgets that track going prices on a wide variety of government
prediction markets. This automated mechanism for generating forecasts
would lower program-monitoring costs and encourage more efficient
governance. The President could track progress on the VH-71NXX
with a single number from a trusted aide, for instance, or even with a
quick glance at the executive smartphone.
This paper discusses how to implement prediction markets in
government. Other papers address the costs and benefits of prediction
markets in general.14 Here, the focus falls on ironing out the
administrative and legal wrinkles of government prediction markets.
Because the federal government has only just begun experiments in the
field, many nuts-and-bolts questions remain unresolved. Section I asks
who should run government prediction markets and offers three options,
13.

JEREMIAH

GERTLER,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

RS

22103,

VH-71/VXX

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

6-7

(2009), availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22103.pdf
14.

HANSON, supra note 4; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6; Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 5;

Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., PredictionMarkets: Does Money Matter? 14 ELECTRONIC
MARKETS 243 (2004), available at http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/
DoesMoneyMatter.pdf.
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describing the distinctive costs and benefits of each. Section 2 turns to
another question about government prediction markets: Who should
trade on them? Again, the answer comes in three flavors: government
employees, pre-approved experts, or the public at-large. Section 3
discusses the legal issues raised by prediction markets-especially those
offering cash or valuable prizes to winners-and surveys some potential
legal remedies. Section 4 describes a three-step plan for putting
prediction markets to work for the United States government and,
through it, the People.

Who
Trades?

Government
Employees

Approved
Experts

The Public

Who
Runs?

Private

Outsource

Policing

Less

costs/cheap +

government

under-imforme
rdiog/cheap.

somewhat
infonned
trading.

control/cheap +
many and
diverse traders.

Contracting costs
.
+ under-informed
trading/low legal
.
risk.

Contracting

Contracting
costs + notable
notabl
.essl
and diverse
aderse
traders.

irisks

Costly provision1

In-House

Inprovision

costs/low legal
risk + informed
traders.
Costly

+
moderate legal

Costly'

provision +
notable lgal
nsk/many and

_risk/informed

traders.

diverse tradiers.

Table 1: Relative Cost/Benefit Ratios of Various Types of Real-Money
Government Prediction Markets

Table 1, above, summarizes these results by showing the ratios of
relative cost to relative benefits for various versions of real-money
government prediction markets. As a quick guide to the best options, the
table uses darker shading to designate higher (and thus worse)
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cost/benefit ratios and lighter shades to designate lower, better ones. The
three white cells running from the table's center left side, through the
table's center, ending in the upper right-hand corner mark the optimal
path for putting real-market prediction markets into government service:
starting with prediction markets run by outside contractors and traded on
only by government employees, opening such markets to approved
experts from outside the government, and concluding in a world where
the private sector offers a variety of prediction markets, covering claims
of particular interest to the government as well as other claims, open to
anyone willing to take a shot at forecasting the future.
Because prediction markets seem likely to improve the efficiency of
government processes and do not seem likely to impose net costs on the
public, they merit at least a trial run. Cass Sunstein (then a law
professor, now Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs) put the case for prediction markets this way:
[I]n many cases, private or public institutions might create markets to
provide information on crucial questions; and public institutions
might take that information into account in making judgments about
policy....
Prediction markets need not be a substitute for
deliberation. But if deliberators choose to ignore what they say, they
ought to have a good reason for doing so.
Prediction markets do not offer a crystal ball to the future, of course, and
nothing guarantees that their costs will outweigh their benefits.16 In
particular, government prediction markets raise thorny administrative
and legal questions. This paper answers such questions, showing that
well designed prediction markets offer a cost-effective and legal way to
improve public deliberation.
1.

WHO SHOULD PROVIDE GOVERNMENT

PREDICTION MARKETS?

Those who set up and run government prediction markets will face
a number of design choices, some of which raise legal ramifications.
Who will define the claims traded on a government prediction market?
Can such a market legally reward successful traders with cash payments
or other valuable prizes? For answers to those questions, see Sections 2
and 3, respectively, below. This Section addresses a preliminary
question: Who should set up and run government prediction markets?
Even if they offer a more cost-effective way to generate forecasts
than such alternatives as face-to-face meetings or committee reports,
SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 120.
16. Sharad Goel et al., Prediction Without Markets, YAHOO! RESEARCH (2010),
http://www.research.yahoo.com/files/goel-ec-2010-prediction-without-markets.pdf
(last
visited August 5, 2010).
15.
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prediction markets cannot run themselves. Somebody has to set them up,
choose which claims will be traded, and so forth. Though computer
automation helps to lighten some of these burdens, it also creates
problems that call for specialized technical solutions. Where should
government administrators turn when they want to implement prediction
markets? Three options look most plausible:
* Authorize government employees to set up and operate in-house
prediction markets;
* Contract with private parties to create prediction markets in or for
government; or
* Open public trading in claims of particular interest to the
government by clarifying their legality (and perhaps subsidizing
them).
The choice between the first two options largely boils down to
simple expediency-who can do the job most efficiently-subject to
some generally applicable administrative limits on government
contracting, discussed below. Under the third option, where private
parties do all of the work, the government would simply clear the way
for others-designated experts or members of the public at-large-to
offer and trade on certain pre-approved claims. To win the benefits of
such markets, the government would generally need to do little more
than stand back and monitor prices, though it might also sponsor claims
so that they address specific questions and attract high trading volumes.
That approach offers the virtue of administrative efficiency, but realmoney markets designed along such lines would also raise some legal

issues.17
1.1. In-House Prediction Markets
Just as government agencies sometimes rely on in-house services,
such as computer support, photocopying, or internal mail systems, so too
might they set up and run their own prediction markets. Should they?
Here, as usual, a number of factors decide the question of whether a
government agency should give its employees the risks and burdens of
operating prediction markets, including:
* The costs of in-house government prediction markets compared to
private alternatives (higher, most likely);

17.

See infra § 4.
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* The benefits of maintaining tight control over the operation of
government prediction markets (important, if at all, only for
claims that implicate national security); and
* The laws or policies that encourage or require contracting out
nonessential government services (which will vary across
government institutions and administrations).
Deciding whether government agencies should set up and run their
own prediction markets thus depends on several questions of fact.
Answers to those questions would prove elusive in any event, requiring
careful research into the minutiae of bureaucratic finances and careful
comparison of many different private prediction market providers. Each
agency will have its own experts in such matters. Furthermore, nailing
down the numbers on such questions will not help for long; the
prediction market industry continues to grow and develop, presenting
government administrators with a moving target (albeit one that fairly
dependably trends, thanks to competition and experience, towards greater
efficiency over time).
Given those uncertainties, we must turn to generalities.
Government agencies may have many virtues, but speed and economy do
not generally number among them. In this particular case, moreover, the
government's own rules against conditionally transferring money across
agency lines would rule out setting up a single, centralized prediction
market that all federal agencies could tap, thwarting economies of
scale.'5 If each agency has to fund its own prediction market, it seems
likely that keeping the operation of government prediction markets
entirely in-house would waste resources; rather than each creating its
own prediction market from scratch, agencies would do better to contract
out the work. Private parties have already figured out how to set up and
run prediction markets and have won ample experience in helping private
companies and their employees learn how to use them.19 Outsourcing,
discussed in the next Section, thus probably offers the most efficient way
to set up and run government prediction markets.

18.

Robin Hanson, Decision Marketsfor Policy Advice, in PROMOTING THE GENERAL

WELFARE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 151 (Alan S. Gerber and
Eric M. Patashnik, eds., Brookings 2006), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/
impolite.pdf (last visited March 13, 2011).
19. See, e.g., Crowd Predictions, CROWDCLARITY, http://www.slideshare.net/havara/
crowd-clarity (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
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1.2. Outsourced
Several private, for-profit companies have offered prediction market
services, typically to large commercial entities such as Hewlett Packard 20
or General Motors. 2 1 Given that government agencies often contract out
the provision of services, especially those that private parties in
competitive environments already supply, it probably makes sense for
the government to also outsource its prediction market needs. Even
given economies of scale, it is not likely that government workers could
set up and run a prediction market more efficiently than an experienced
private consultant.
To say that the government should contract with private parties for
prediction market services is not to say how it should do so. Even when
the government outsources, some red tape remains. In particular, any
federal agency buying prediction market services under contract should
take care to satisfy the federal Acquisition of Information Technology
regulations.22 Those regulations, in brief, would require that the
government comply with certain circulars from the Office of
Management and Budget, manage risk prudently, use modular
contracting, provide privacy protections, and satisfy disabled access
design parameters. Other rules, perhaps unique to particular government
agencies or departments, might also apply. State governments doubtless
have their own red tape. Only bureaucrats deep within each particular
institution, and well-versed in its particular ways, would likely know
how to wend among the administrative pitfalls-a point which in itself
suggests much about the efficacy, relative to the in-house option, of
hiring private parties to provide the government with prediction market
services.
1.3. Privately Produced
Privately produced prediction markets can come from any source
other than the government, such as a private university, a public-spirited
philanthropist, or a profit-seeking commercial enterprise. Nevertheless,
the government can use such markets to help determine answers to such
policy-related questions as the future of global warming or welfare
caseload trends. So long as the right questions get asked, and the proper
procedures are implemented, it doesn't matter who does the asking. The
20. Charles Plott & Kay-Yut Chen, Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept,
Design and Field Implementation for a Sales ForecastingProblem (Cal. Inst. Tech.,
Paper No. 1131, 2002), available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wpll31.pdf
(describing use of prediction markets at Hewlett-Packard to forecast printer sales).
21.

CROWDCLARITY, supra note 19.

22.

48 C.F.R. pt. 39 (2011).
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privately produced option thus offers the government the prospect of
winning all the benefits of prediction markets at minimal public cost. At
present, however, state and federal laws and regulations discourage nongovernment parties from providing real-money prediction markets (a
catch-all that here means markets offering valuable consideration to
winning traders).23 The federal government can fix that problem by
clarifying the legality of such markets under U.S. law, whether by
executive pronouncement, legislation, or judicial opinion.
To some degree, privately produced prediction markets already
exist, and already tackle questions important to governance. The
Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, for instance, has for many years
offered play-money trading on questions such as the effects of global
24
climate change and the likelihood of a cure for cancer. As Foresight's
example demonstrates, the First Amendment protects our freedom to
opine on important issues of the day through open-access play-money
trading on public policy claims. 25 Nevertheless, play-money prediction
markets have hardly become objects of widespread interest or ordinary
tools of government in the U.S. Perhaps a concerted public relations
effort or more intuitive interfaces would make play-money markets more
popular and useful. It seems more likely, though, that play-money
prediction markets provide inadequate incentives to attract many,
diverse, and informed traders on claims about issues important to
shaping public policy. Traders evidently prefer real money.
All else being equal, the government should also prefer real-money
prediction markets. Although research suggests that play-money markets
may suffice to reveal extant information in some circumstances, realmoney markets do a better job of encouraging the discovery of new
information.26 That should surprise nobody, given that only real-money
trading can offer the prospect of offsetting research costs with market
winnings. At all events, mere play-money looks unlikely to generate
sufficient excitement to attract ample public participation. Real-money
prediction markets thus appear likely to do better than play-money
markets at generating widely informed and well-researched answers to
hard questions.
23.

See generally, Tom W. Bell, Private Prediction Markets and the Law, 3 J.
MARKETS
89 (2009), available at http://tomwbell.com/writings/
PrivatePMs&theLaw.pdf, Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress
of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 37 (2006); Tom W. Bell,
Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality of Markets in Science
Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REv. 159 (2002).
24. THE FORESIGHT EXCHANGE PREDICTION MARKET, http://www.ideosphere.com/
(last visited March 14, 2011).
25. U.S. CONST., amend I.
26. Servan-Schreiber, supra note 14.
PREDICTION
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Real-money prediction markets cannot rely on the First Amendment
to bar legal and political interference, however, and a panoply of state
and federal laws and regulations threaten such enterprises. 27 The sole
real-money prediction market in the U.S. offers small-stakes trading on
political and economic events under cover of a no-action letter from the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission.28 Nobody in the U.S. offers
prediction markets with thick trading for material stakes. Instead,
domestic traders use the Internet to access a real-money prediction
market based in Ireland, which thanks to its overseas location enjoys a
respite from the uncertainties imposed by U.S. law. 29 Sound arguments
suggest that properly designed real-money prediction markets should
escape prosecution. 30 Proof of that claim, however, might come only
after long and costly litigation-a prospect that has discouraged privately
produced real-money prediction markets in the U.S.
The federal government could help to dissipate the pall of legal
uncertainty by designating (via legislation, regulation, or executive
order) certain types of trading in certain types of claims as legal under
federal commodities futures and securities regulations, and as exempt
from state gambling, insurance, and bucket-shop laws. The Appendix
offers a model statute that would have just that effect. Clearing away
those legal uncertainties would encourage entrepreneurs to launch and
run prediction markets at no government cost. (Such entrepreneurs
might suffer personal costs, of course, but all in the hope of greater
personal gain.) Yet, the prices generated from such markets would prove
just as predictive-perhaps, thanks to the power of prospective gains to
encourage traders to research, even more predictive-than markets run
by or under contract with the government.
Suppose that private parties in the U.S. come to provide real-money
prediction markets in claims relating to public policy. The government
would then face the happy prospect of getting all of the benefits of inhouse and outsourced prediction markets at no cost to taxpayers. Does
that sound too good to be true? Indeed, two caveats apply. The first
goes to economics; the second to politics.

27. Infra § 4.
28. IOWA ELECTRONIC MARKETS, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/about/index.html
(last visited August 3, 2010).
29. INTRADE, http://www.intrade.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
30. See Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts, supranote 23.
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1.3.1. The Economic Caveat
To simply open up trading on a claim of interest to the
government-say, that an earthquake measuring at least 3.0 on the
Richter scale will strike the New Madrid fault in the next year-does not
guarantee that the public will take enough interest in the claim to
generate trading thick enough to provide useful information. It may even
turn out that no market wants to host trading on the claim. Perhaps
nobody cares much about relatively small earthquakes in the Missouri
boot heel region, for instance, or perhaps nobody thinks they know
enough about the actual odds to beat conventional wisdom. In those
sorts of cases, the government may find it necessary to give would-be
traders a greater prospect of gain by subsidizing the market, such as by
making random trades on the claim, thereby stimulating trading.31
While subsidizing private markets would entail some public costs,
privately produced prediction markets would still probably cost the
government less than in-house or outsourced prediction markets. So we
can regard the first caveat, the economic one, as no more than a
qualification: Even privately-produced prediction markets may entail
government expenditures. That observation merely limits the policy
gains of relying on private sources for the government's prediction
market services, however; it does not mean that privately-produced
prediction markets would cost taxpayers more than in-house or
outsourced ones.
1.3.2. The Political Caveat
Even if they are not comparatively expensive, however, government
subsidies of prediction markets might create a political complication:
The government might not want to be associated with trading in certain
claims, such as those relating to political unrest in other countries. At the
same time, however, government agents working in diplomatic relations,
intelligence, defense, and other departments might sorely want to
encourage thick and informed trading on such claims. Curing caveat
one, by subsidizing certain claims, might thus give rise to caveat two,
embarrassing the government by association. Indeed, just those sorts of
political problems derailed the federal government's first foray into
prediction markets.32
The problem might never arise, granted, given that the very nature
of politically sensitive claims might ensure sufficiently thick trading to
3 1. Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking,
and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 960-62 (2004).

32.

Hanson, supra note 18.
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render any government subsidy unnecessary. 33 And, at any rate, cures
would lie ready at hand. The government could subsidize worrisome
claims through private intermediaries, for instance, creating a sort of
public relations firewall by taking a hands-off approach to the specific
content of claims and cutting off funding to projects that veer into public
relations problems. Alternatively, the government could keep trading in
certain claims completely in-house, limiting participation and
information about prices to employees and other trusted parties. That
runs the risk of cutting off the very outsiders most likely to know the
facts on the ground, of course, but even a half-blind prediction market
might see more clearly than no market at all.
In the extreme, the government might try to ban all public trading in
these sorts of claims, such as those pertaining to the assassination of
political figures or to sensitive diplomatic negotiations, that threaten to
reveal inconvenient truths. But to define inherently suspect claims in
advance might prove tricky, and outlawing them might deny the
government crucial information. As demonstrated by the ready access
that U.S. residents already enjoy to overseas prediction markets,
moreover, banning claims that truly attract a great deal of trading would
probably prove ineffectual. It does not look likely that even the most
outrageous claims would reward evil, given that extant markets already
offer ample opportunity to profit from assassinations, terrorism, and
The vagueness and futility of
other financially significant acts.
attempting to forbid public trading in politically sensitive predictions
only strengthens the First Amendment case against such content-based
restrictions. 34 Prohibition thus looks like no option at all.
2.

WHO SHOULD TRADE ON GOVERNMENT PREDICTION MARKETS?

Who should trade on government prediction markets? This Section
considers three answers:
* Open such markets solely to government employees;
* Open them to outside experts; or
33. Indeed, to return to the example that opened this paper, it turns out that the
unrest in Egypt generated enough interest to encourage Ireland-based Intrade to set up
real-money trading, though the exchange bobbled the claim and had to unwind trading.
See Chris F. Masse, InTrade CEO John Delaney apologizesfor the 'MubarakDeparture'
prediction market scandal, MIDASORACLE (February 8, 2011), http://www.midasoracle.
org/2011/02/08/intrade-ceo-apologizes-mubarak-departure-prediction-market-scandalmubarak-market-unwound/.
34. For a summary-and critique-of the strict scrutiny test generally applicable to
content-based restrictions on speech, see Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech,
PermissibleTailoring and TranscendingStrict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996).
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* Open them to everyone.
Each of those options has pluses and minuses. The comparisons
made here demonstrate that, generally speaking, widening the pool of
people allowed to trade on a prediction market increases both the
market's accuracy and the legal risks of hosting or trading on it.
A market open to only a select few high-ranking government
officials would not likely suffer prosecution (though it might suffer
criticism on other fronts). Who would dare call such a tightly controlled,
in-house, management tool a gambling enterprise or unregistered
commodities futures trading? So tightly controlled a market also runs
little risk, however, of accurately reflecting the facts on the ground, far
away from government offices. At the other extreme, a market open to
anyone and everyone, though optimized to reveal otherwise hidden facts,
would generate certain risks. Especially if it allowed real-money trading,
an open-access government prediction market would face scrutiny under
anti-gambling and commodities futures trading rules. Such legal scrutiny
might even generate legal claims.
Fortunately, we need not settle once and for all the question of who
should trade on government prediction markets. Regardless of how far
the door to trading on such markets ought to open, it will probably open
in careful increments. Agencies will probably start with markets open
If that
only to government employees-the safest legal option.
experiment generates promising results, the door to trading will probably
widen to admit qualified experts. Later still, trading might open to the
public at large, as prediction markets mature into a useful and trusted
method of governance. 35
3.

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY GOVERNMENT PREDICTION MARKETS,
AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES

So long as it offers no prizes, cash, or other consideration to traders,
a prediction market will not likely offend any law. To the contrary, a
non-commercial means of reporting on opinions about questions of
public policy would likely win the protections of the First Amendment. 3 6
A government prediction market that rewarded successful traders with no
more than bragging rights would thus raise few legal issues. It might
raise political issues, granted; for instance, the government would want
to avoid endorsing certain controversial claims (such as those pertaining
35. See infra § 4 (offering further observations about the optimal development path
for government prediction markets).
36. U.S. CoNsT., amend. I.
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to assassinations or secret programs). 37 But so long as the governmentor a private party under government contract-gives nothing more to
winning traders than words of thanks, freedom of expression should
prevail.
Perhaps, then, the government should proceed directly with setting
up or encouraging pure-talk prediction markets in claims likely to inform
good public policy. Some good citizens might happily trade on a U.S.
Federal Policy Forum, offering what insight they could to important
questions of the day and jockeying with like folk for the pride of having
best served the common good. This forum, however, might not suffice
to attract an adequate volume of trade or sufficiently well informed
traders. Regardless of whether talk is cheap, talkers respond to
incentives. Offering prizes, cash, or other valuable consideration to
traders encourages them to incur the costs of discovering useful
information-information that might otherwise remain hidden.
Government prediction markets should thus aspire to offer traders the
prospect of genuine material gain.
This Section focuses on the legal issues raised by real-money
government prediction markets, a term that encompasses all such
markets where traders stand to gain or lose valuable consideration for
their forecasts. The legal status of real-money prediction markets
remains unclear under U.S. law. Such markets resemble, but do not
equate to, gambling, commodities futures, or securities markets.
Government prediction markets can best avoid the scope of those illfitting laws by adopting these features:
* Contract with traders, whether employees or outside experts, to
require that they engage in some minimum level of trading in
order to receive payment;
* Pay traders by giving them a stake in the market and make overall
compensation contingent upon the accuracy of their trades;
* Make absolutely clear, by public notice and agreements with
traders, that the market does not fall under gambling,
commodities futures, or securities laws or regulations; and
* Make all trades spot transactions in negotiable conditional notes.

37. See supra § 1.3.2 for a discussion of the political issues raised by federal
prediction markets.
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Any government prediction market would do well to adopt these
policies. It looks most likely, however, that the executive branch of the
federal government will continue its pioneering role in implementing
prediction markets.
To the above list of precautions, therefore, the
Office of the President can and should add this one:
* Assert federal preemption against interference by state officials
and branch privilege against interference by federal independent
commissions or non-executive officials.
The following subsections discuss how various bodies of lawthose pertaining to gambling, commodities futures, securities, and
inducement to illegal activity-relate to real-money prediction markets.
In some cases, those old laws plainly do not reach this new institution.
In other cases, real-money prediction markets would do well to adopt
certain prophylactics, outlined above and described more fully below, to
safeguard against legal risks.
3.1. Gambling
Although real-money prediction markets in claims pertaining to
matters of public policy run some risk of drawing prosecutorial
accusations of illegal gambling, it looks very unlikely that any court
would agree. Proper market design-most notably, treating traders as
consultants paid on contingency for generating accurate predictionscould help mitigate legal risks that remain. Furthermore, prediction
markets sponsored by the federal government would enjoy immunity
from state anti-gambling laws (and thus also the federal anti-gambling
laws triggered by state law violations).3 9
Gambling comprises three elements in U.S. law: prize, chance, and
consideration. Play-money prediction markets successfully dodge the
first element, thus protecting them from prosecution on state and federal
anti-gambling laws. In contrast, real-money prediction markets (or more
generally any prediction market that rewards accurate forecasts with
something of value) satisfy the "prize" element, taking them one-third of
the way towards gambling. No prediction market should satisfy the
"chance" element, however, because under the prevailing American rule,
"chance" obtains only if skill offers no edge in determining who comes

38. For a review of the federal executive branch's forays into prediction markets, see
supra§ 1.
39. Bell, Prediction Marketsfor Promoting the Progress ofScience and the Useful
Arts, supra note 23, at 5-67.
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out ahead in an exchange. 4 0 Lotteries, if run properly, show pure chance
at work. A government prediction market would not emphasize chance;
it would instead focus on questions where skill determines winners.
That should end the inquiry, because gambling cannot arise if the
element of chance is not present. The best mechanisms for controlling
legal risk employ redundancy, however, so it also merits exploring how
government prediction markets could dodge gambling's "consideration"
element. It should suffice to contractually mandate participation by
employees or outside contractors and to ensure that nobody stakes his or
her own money to play. To merely allow or encourage people to play the
market would, in contrast, invite the claim that traders offered
consideration in the form of time or effort. Anyone who stakes his or her
own money puts up valuable consideration, too, of course. To defeat the
consideration element of gambling, therefore, government prediction
markets should require its employees or agents to play the market,
whether as part of the overall employment agreement or by special
contract, and should front payment in the form of seed capital.
This sort of prediction market architecture would help any party,
The federal
government or private, avoid anti-gambling laws.
government enjoys yet another defense, though: preemption. For
example, if the Department of Defense decided that a real-money
prediction market, run under contract by outside consultants and open to
designated traders, would help it to achieve its lawful objectives, state
anti-gambling laws would fall by the wayside as unconstitutional
impediments to federal authority.4 1
3.2. Commodities Futures Trading
Prediction markets have been likened to commodities futures
markets, an analogy that would, if courts took it seriously, pose a choice
between stifling regulations or fatal prosecution. Thus far, however, it
remains unclear whether and to what extent the jurisdiction of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") would reach
prediction markets offering trading in claims pertaining to public policy
issues. Although the sole real-money prediction market operating in the
U.S., the Iowa Electronic Markets, counts on a CFTC no-action letter to
protect it from state prosecutors, the letter by no means amounts to a
40. Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, Symposium: Cross Border Issues in
Gaming: The Games People Play: Is It Time for a New Legal Approach to Prize Games?
4 NEV. L.J. 197, 223 (2003) ("Most states and the federal government have adopted this
test to assess the existence of the gambling element of chance.").
41. Those who set up the Policy Analysis Markets under contract with the DoD's
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency relied on the same argument to alleviate
any concern about interference by state authorities. Hanson, supra note 18.
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jurisdictional claim.4 2 Some scholars assert that the CFTC does or
should have such jurisdiction, as they welcome the preemptive effect that
federal regulation would have on state laws.43 That approach arguably
underestimates the transaction costs of navigating CFTC regulations,
however, and at any rate would have little to offer any government
prediction market sponsored by the federal government, which thanks to
the Supremacy Clause would not need CFTC jurisdiction as shelter from
hostile state laws.4 The prospect of intra-federal interference, as might
arise if the CFTC asserted jurisdiction over a prediction market run by
another part of the U.S. government, raises different and less easily
resolved questions. Fortunately, though, a prediction market offering

only spot transactions (rather than futures) in negotiable conditional
notes (rather than contracts) should escape CFTC jurisdiction.
The CFTC's recent approval of certain contracts pertaining to
motion picture box office revenues gives some indication of how broadly
Three of the five
the CFTC has interpreted its jurisdiction.
commissioners joined in a statement asserting that the CFTC's authority
reaches even a commodity, such as the movie revenues in question, that
"is a non-price-based measure of an economic activity, commercial
activity or environmental event ... that can be used for a hedging
purpose when incorporated into a futures or options contract." 46 The
Commission added that the existence of a cash market in the commodity
is not necessary in such cases, and that contracts within the CFTC's
jurisdiction may be based on an event or activity with economic
consequences. 7 Those criteria, which the CFTC judged fit the box
office revenues under its consideration, might also fit many of the
questions that the government might want to submit to trading on
42. Letter from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, Division of Trading and Markets,
CFTC, to Prof. George R. Neumann, Professor Economics, University of Iowa (Feb. 5,
1992) (on filed with the CFTC), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/
foirf0503b002.pdf [hereinafter 1992 CFTC Letter]; Letter from Andrea M. Corcoran,
Director, Division of Trading and Markets, CFTC, to Prof. George R. Neumann,
Professor Economics, University of Iowa (June 18 1993) (on file with the CFTC),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/foirfO5O3bOO4.pdf [hereinafter 1993
CFTC Letter].
43. Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 5, at 272-73.
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . .. shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
45. Bell, Prediction Marketsfor Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts, supra note 23, at 54-55, 67-77; Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the
Future,supra note 5, at 169-72.
46. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Statement of the Commission, In
Re MDEX 3 (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/
@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexcommissionstatement061410.pdf.
47. Id at 3-4.
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prediction markets. A claim about whether the VH-71/VXX Presidential
Helicopter Program will trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach, for instance,
could provide a non-price-based measure of an economic or commercial
activity that could, when incorporated into a futures or options contract,
be used to hedge against the risk that the claim might come true.
Does that mean government prediction markets would fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC? Not necessarily. First, note that in
the CFTC's recent deliberations over box office contracts, as in its earlier
deliberations over contracts relating to such things as weather futures and
unemployment claims, private parties had requested CFTC jurisdiction
(doubtless both to enjoy preemption from state laws and to win
reassurance that the CFTC would not itself prosecute). 48 That the CFTC
responded favorably to such requests by adopting a broad interpretation
of its jurisdiction does not necessarily imply that the CFTC would
likewise extend its jurisdiction into areas where it was not wanted.
Second, note that the Commission decided it had jurisdiction over box
office contracts only by the barest of margins, in a 3-2 vote, and over two
strongly worded dissents.49 Commissioner Sommers objected that the
majority's expansive interpretation of CFTC's jurisdiction "crosses a line
that should not be crossed," adding of the box office revenue contracts,
"it is unclear to me how they fit into our current regulatory structure."50
At any rate, that CFTC foray into regulating something at least
facially resembling prediction markets ultimately proved futile. Studio
heads evidently did not welcome the prospect of accurate public
forecasts of motion picture box office revenues, and federal lawmakers
quickly stepped in to shut down the very markets the CFTC had
embraced. 5 ' This episode thus teaches not only what the CFTC thinks it
can do, but also what Congress thinks it should not do.

48. Id. at 3.
49. See Dissent of Commissioner Bart Chilton from Approval of Media Derivatives
Exchange's Opening Weekend Motion Picture Revenue Futures and Binary Option
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/
14,
2010),
(June
Contracts
documents/ifdocs/mdexdissentingchilton06l4l0.pdf; Dissent of Commissioner Jill E.
Sommers from Approval of Media Derivatives Exchange's Opening Weekend Motion
Picture Revenue Futures and Binary Option Contracts (June 14, 2010),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexdissentingsom
mers061410.pdf [hereinafter Sommers Dissent].
50. See Sommers Dissent, supra note 49, at 2.
51. Ben Fritz, Cantor Fitzgerald abandoning box-office futures despite regulatory
approval, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2010, 3:11 PM), http://Iatimesblogs.1atimes.com/
entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/06/cantor-fitzgerald-abandoning-box-office-futuresdespite-regulatory-approval.html.
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3.3. Securities Regulations
History and policy strongly suggest that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") should have no authority over realmoney prediction markets trading claims about public policy questions.
Securities markets amass capital for productive investment, whereas
prediction markets pit traders against one another in contest to claim
their pooled funds. Consideration of the statutes that define the authority
of the SEC leads to the same conclusion. Although those statutes speak
broadly, they do not appear to reach the sort of negotiable conditional
notes that would be traded on well-designed government prediction
markets.52 As an added safeguard against SEC interference, anyone who
runs a real money prediction market should put traders on notice that
they trade outside the authority of the SEC.
3.4. Inducement to Illegal Activity
The U.S. federal government's first venture into prediction markets
ended in a hasty retreat. In 2001, the Department of Defense's blue-sky
research agency, DARPA, contracted with private parties to set up and
run publicly-accessible real-money prediction markets on questions of
military and political instability. Early tests looked promising, and the
Policy Analysis Market ("PAM") prepared to go live. Controversy broke
out in 2003, however, after the PAM website offered colorful examples
of miscellaneous claims that might be traded, including: the possibility
that Yassir Arafat might be assassinated; that North Korea would launch
a missile attack; and that the king of Jordan would be overthrown.54
Responding to criticisms that PAM threatened to make terrorism
profitable-as well as for other reasons (including simple bad luck)-the
DoD cancelled the program.
That case study demonstrates only that government prediction
markets have good political reasons to avoid claims pegged to specific
illegal activities, however, it does not speak to the law. Legally
speaking, a claim like, "Yassir Arafat will be assassinated," even if it
offered to pay hard cash, would not rise to the level of criminal or
tortious inducement. Courts require that proof of evil intent accompany
allegations of inducement to illegal activity. 6 No such intent would
52.

53.

See infra § 4.2.
Bell, Prediction Marketsfor Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful

Arts, supra note 23, at 77-82.

54.
55.
56.

Hanson, supra note 18.
Id.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,

930-935 (2005).
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likely be present in the case of prediction markets. After all, nobody
who wants to induce illegal activity would choose highly public
prediction markets as the vehicle. Neither, of course, would anyone
ready to commit illegal acts for money depend on a prediction market to
win compensation.
Prediction markets offer such ineffective
mechanisms for encouraging torts or crimes that it is hard to see how
anybody could reasonably intend to put them to such nefarious uses.
Political factors counsel against a prediction market hosting claims tied
to specific illegal acts, however, the law stands as no bar.
3.5. Clarifying the Legality of Government PredictionMarkets
As described above, real-money prediction markets face a number
of legal risks. Even if none of those risks ripens into an adverse
judgment, the uncertain status of real-money prediction markets under
state and federal law discourages their development in the United States.
The Iowa Electronic Markets-the sole exception to that rule-enjoys
the unique protection of two no-action letters from the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission.57 Most U.S.-based traders on real-money
prediction markets thus rely on easy Internet access to markets, such as
Intrade, based overseas, beyond the reach of U.S. law. Establishing the
legality of real-money prediction markets under U.S. law would have a
number of salutatory effects:
* Encouraging growth in the U.S. prediction market industry;
* Curbing inefficient regulatory overreach; and
* Providing the government with cost-free and reliable public
policy forecasts.
How can the federal government establish the legality of realmoney prediction markets under U.S. law? It could accomplish a great
deal simply by structuring its markets to avoid legal challenges,
following guidelines discussed elsewhere in this paper. Mere familiarity
will eventually help, too. Once real-money prediction markets have been
operating for some years and become accepted tools of good governance,
they will less likely excite the attention of any over-eager prosecutor. At
some point, though, establishing the legality of real-money prediction

57.
58.

1992 CFTC Letter, supra note 42; 1993 CFTC Letter, supra note 42.
INTRADE, http://www.intrade.com (visited March 13, 2011).
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markets might call for stronger measures-stronger, but still well within
the recognized authority of the U.S. federal government.
Because the Constitution establishes that it and the laws made
pursuant to its authority "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," 59 the
federal government has the power to preempt countervailing state law in
a variety of circumstances. We can already thank preemption of a sort,
generated by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for protecting playmoney prediction markets from state interference. Trading on the
Foresight Exchange Prediction Market, for instance, qualifies more as
free expression than as free enterprise. 6 0 Real-money prediction markets
do not win the same solicitude, however; they risk falling prey to antigambling, bucket shop, and other state laws.61 Because the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not preempt these state laws, prediction
markets would have to turn to federal regulations or statutes for shelter.
Federal regulations have just as much power to preempt as federal
statutes do.62 The Supreme Court has established a lenient standard of
review for regulations that preempt state law, holding that the regulation
will stand unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that
Congress would not have permitted such preemption. 63 As long as an
agency acts within the authority granted to it by federal lawmakers,
therefore, it should not suffer state interference with its prediction
markets or claims. Though a federal statute specifically preempting state
interference would offer welcome clarity on the question, any federal
agency would have a strong claim to possessing the power to preempt
state laws or regulations that interfere with the use of management tools,
such as prediction markets, that help the agency pursue its authorized
aims.
4.

GOVERNING WITH PREDICTION MARKETS

How can the government best put prediction markets to work in the
public interest? This Section offers some answers. Subsection 4.1
addresses who should run and trade on government prediction markets.
It explains that the government should begin with the low risk, low
return option: an outsourced prediction market accessible only to
specified federal employees.
From there, the government should
59. U.S. Const. art.VI, cl. 2.
60. See THE FORESIGHT EXCHANGE PREDICTION MARKET, http://www.ideosphere.
com/ (last visited March 14, 2011).
61. See Bell 2006, supra note 23, at 65-67, 69.
62. Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
("Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.").
63. New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002); Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).
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endeavor to open trading up, allowing many and diverse traders to join in
forecasting the future.
Under present laws, alas, the types of markets most likely to
generate the best predictions also pose the largest legal risks. Subsection
4.2 explains how the right sort of architecture can protect prediction
markets against such hazards. Section 4.3 details the authority of the
Office of the President to oversee the development of government
prediction markets. Section 4.4 offers a plan for putting prediction
markets to work for the public good.
4.1. The Three Stages of Government Prediction Markets
To tap the power of prediction markets, the government should take
three steps:
* First, contract-out the creation of real-money prediction markets
open only to government employees;
* Second, open government prediction markets to designated
experts;
* Third, clarify the legality of real-money, publicly-accessible
prediction markets, encouraging non-government parties to create
and trade on them.
In effect, these three steps mark the optimal path through the costbenefit matrix presented in Table 1, above-a path that starts in the
center-left box, moves to the center one, and ends with a jump up and to
the right. Table 2, below, illustrates.
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Experts

The Public

Step 3:
Privately
produced, open
access markets.

Private
Sector

Outsource
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Step 1:
Outsourced
markets open to
government
employees, only.

Step 2:
Outsourced
markets open to
approved
experts.

In-House

Table 2: Three-Step Program for Governing with Real-Money
Prediction Markets
By developing prediction markets in those three steps, the
government will maintain an optimal cost/benefit ratio. Each step will
also result in better predictions-hence the reason why the government
should not rest at step one or two, but rather should keep moving toward
the goal of privately produced real-money markets open to the general
public. Granted, each step toward that goal also increases the legal risks
associated with running or trading the prediction market in question.
Those risks will decrease with time, however, and with experience in
running real-money prediction markets. At some point, therefore, step
two will offer a plainly more cost-effective option than step one. A
similar evolutionary process will likewise tend to drive down the legal
risks associated with step three. Step three offers the government an
additional cost savings, moreover: The legal risks of privately produced,
real-money prediction markets will fall on non-government parties.
Indeed, those risks will, if they arise at all, come largely from the
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government itself. Over time and in the main, therefore, the government
would do best to move from contracting for prediction markets to
counting on the private sector to run them, and from letting only
government employees trade on closed markets to letting anyone trade
on open ones.
4.2. Legal Architecturefor Government PredictionMarkets
The prior subsection's three-step development plan, while
demonstrating why government prediction markets should grow less
insular and more public over time, leaves out a great many details.
Practical experience and on-the-spot fixes will determine many of the
particulars of government prediction markets, of course. Even at this
remove, though, we can picture the sort of legal architecture that will
best shelter government prediction markets, at each of the three stages of
their development, from running afoul of commodities futures, securities,
or gambling statutes and regulations.
* Step 1: Out-sourced markets open to government employees,
only. Structure the market to host spot transactions in negotiable
conditional notes payable in the event associated predictions
come true-not in futures contracts or securities. Give employees
money to play the market and mandate trading, removing the
stigma of gambling. Reward the best predictions with cash or
cash equivalents. Avoid conditional transfers of money across
agency lines.
* Step 2: Out-sourced markets open to approved experts.
Expand government prediction markets by contracting with select
outside traders. Compensate them with seeded accounts, and
require a minimum number of trades. Those who predict the best
earn the most.
* Step 3: Privately produced, open access markets. Clarify the
legality of privately produced, real-money, publicly accessible
prediction markets by way of example, persuasion, litigation,
regulation, or legislation.
The legal architecture of government prediction markets should thus
develop as those markets do, in stages. In every case, basing trading in
negotiable conditional notes, payable in the event some associated
prediction comes true, would help to ward off jurisdictional assertions by
commodities futures or securities regulators. The defense against
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gambling-fronting trading funds and contractually mandating tradingwould work best in stages one and two. In stage three, when private
markets and public traders provide the government with needed
predictions, other institutional frameworks would develop.
Markets that let traders risk their own funds run a heightened risk of
exposure to anti-gambling laws. In a better world, the fact that skill can
predominate over chance in determining winnings on a prediction market
would suffice to protect such markets from unwarranted prosecution. In
this, our imperfect world, entrepreneurs might hesitate to launch a realmoney prediction market without some sort of legal shield against antigambling laws-a legal shield that might be won through litigation,
regulation, or legislation.
4.3. A uthorizationfor Government PredictionMarkets
There can be little doubt that federal officials have adequate
authority to put prediction markets to work in pursuit of the public good.
After all, government employees already make conference calls, generate
forecasts, and hire outside experts. Prediction markets merely add to that
collection of administrative tools. Any federal body that has sufficient
authority to adopt new and useful management tools would presumably
also have authority to implement government prediction markets.
Perhaps the Library of Congress might find prediction markets a useful
adjunct to its research mission, for instance. So far, though, and for
understandable reasons, the Office of the President has taken the lead in
exploring how prediction markets can serve the public good.64 Thus, this
Section focuses on defining the federal executive branch's authority to
implement government prediction markets.
Although the Office of the President of course has ultimate
responsibility over whether and how the executive branch puts prediction
markets to work, some subordinate office would doubtless in practice
handle the details. More likely than not, the President would order the
Office of Management and Budget (the "OMB") to initiate, monitor, and
manage any program to implement government prediction markets. The
OMB offers a likely home for any such program because it includes both
the Office of Science and Technology Policy (the "OSTP") and the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (the "OIRA").
OSTP has authority to implement government prediction markets
under its organic statute, which calls on the Office to: "evaluate the
scale, quality, and effectiveness of the Federal effort in science and
64. For a survey of those forays into the field-first via the Policy Analysis Market,
then via the Synthetic Biology market, and most recently via the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence's ACE program, see supra § 1.
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technology" 65 and "assist the President in providing general leadership
and coordination of the research and development programs of the
Federal Government." 66 To fulfill those legislated functions, the OSTP
might assist the President in supervising tests of government prediction
markets, advising the President on whether and how to employ such
markets more generally throughout the Executive Branch and helping
other offices put them to good use.
The OIRA also has authority to encourage the use of prediction
markets by federal agencies.67 Federal lawmakers gave the OIRA broad
authority to direct the use of information technology by government
agencies. The OIRA Administrator has the duty to
(A) develop, coordinate and oversee the implementation of Federal
information resources management policies, principles, standards,
and guidelines; and
(B) provide direction and oversee(i) the review and approval of the collection of information and
the reduction of the information collection burden;
(ii) agency dissemination of and public access to information;
[and]
68
(iii) statistical activities. ...

Furthermore, in statutory provisions seemingly written with
predction markets in mind, lawmakers specifically commanded the
Administrator to:
* "foster greater sharing, dissemination, and access to public
information";
* "reduce information collection burdens on the public";
* "maximize the practical utility of and public benefit from
information collected by or for the Federal Government";
* "promote public access to public information"; and

65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6613(b)(2) (West 2002) (describing authority and functions of the
Director of the OSTP).
66. Id. at § 6613(b)(4).
67. Bell (2010), supra note 23, at 69-71.
68. 44 U.S.C.A.§ 3504(a)(1) (West 2002) (describing authority and functions of the
Director of the OMB).

2011]

GOVERNMENT PREDICTION MARKETS: WHY, WHO, AND How

431

* take a wide variety of measures to improve the efficiency,
integrity, and utility of federal policies for collecting and
disseminating statistical information.69
The O1RA can very plausibly argue that prediction markets offer an
excellent means for fulfilling those, its legislated aims.
The OIRA can cite the commands of the President as further
justification for encouraging the development of federal prediction
markets. The White House has, by Executive Order, directed federal
agencies to base regulatory actions on the best "scientific, technical,
economic, and other information" available and designated OIRA as the
repository of expertise in such matters. 70 All told, that gives OIRA
considerable leeway in getting federal agencies to implement prediction
markets.
4.4. Ninety Days and Beyond
The prior subsections have discussed the stages through which
government prediction markets should develop, the major legal features
that those markets should embody at each such stage, and the authority
of the Executive Office to encourage and guide the development of
government prediction markets. This subsection offers specifics about
what steps the President might order the OMB to take, immediately and
in the near future, to help government prediction markets flourish.
Experimental Use of Government Prediction Markets
In the next 90 days, the OMB directs the OSTP and OIRA, in
coordination with outside researchers, to initiate and monitor several
experiments in government prediction markets. Academics have already
come close to creating prediction markets to inform government action,71
and the executive branch has already launched experiments in play72
It remains only for the OSTP and OIRA to oversee
money markets.
trial runs of real-money markets set up for government employees or
specified consultants. Relying on outside contractors to set up and run
the markets will generate the fastest results. Given the salient problem of
predicting the expenses of weapons procurement programs, and the
69. Id. at § 3504(b)(2)-(e).
70. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735-44 §§ 1(b)(7), 2(b) (Oct. 4, 1993),
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385-86 (Feb. 28, 2002); Exec. Order
No. 13,422,72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007).
71.

See, e.g., Predictinga Pandemic,IOWA ELECTRONIC HEALTH MARKETS, (July 16,

2010), http://iehm.uiowa.edu/iehm/imgs/PredictingPandemic Brief final.pdf.
72. See supra § 1.
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Department of Defense's demonstrated willingness to try prediction
markets, it might work best to start with a market designed to forecast
Nunn-McCurdy breaches.
Government Prediction Markets Conference
In the next six months, the OIRA calls together public servants,
private consultants, and academics to discuss early experimental results
and plan how prediction markets might improve the governing process.
As authority, the OIRA can cite the President's command to "convene,
from time to time, conferences with representatives of businesses,
nongovernmental organizations, and the public to discuss regulatory
issues of common concern."7 Partnering with an outside university or
think tank could help to spread the burdens of hosting such a gathering
and widen the net of participants. At least part of the conference would
address the results of the short-term experiments described in step one.
Among other benefits, a conference on government prediction markets
could help the OMB generate guidelines that, as discussed under the next
heading, the OMB could then promulgate via executive memorandum.
OMB Memorandum on Government Prediction Markets
Drawing on the work of OSTP and OIRA, the OMB issues a
memorandum to executive departments and agencies explaining the
hows and whys of government prediction markets. For the most part,
such a memorandum would serve to educate its recipients, though it
should also offer some exhortations. Ideally, the memorandum would
cite successful test cases, such as a real-money market, open only to
government employees and select consultants, designed to predict NunnMcCurdy breaches.
If mere example does not suffice to rouse wider use of government
prediction markets, OMB could promulgate guidelines concerning the
probity of factual evidence submitted in support of proposed regulations.
Such guidelines would make clear, for instance, that claims backed by
independent and peer-reviewed research merit greater credence than
claims backed only by in-house researchers. More to the point, such an
epistemic scorecard could establish that numbers backed by prediction
markets would carry great weight in OMB reviews of agency
regulations. That would give executive departments and agencies an
additional incentive to implement government prediction markets.

73.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735-44 (amended Oct. 4, 1993).
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Beyond OMB and the First Year
The authority of the OMB and its sub-offices should suffice in the
first year or so of implementing government prediction markets. If that
effort triggers the widespread use of real-money prediction markets, both
in government and, eventually, among the public at large, no more need
be done. In that, perhaps too ideal world, prediction markets would
already have succeeded or failed on their own terms, and not by dint of
ignorance, inertia, or illegality. In this, the real world, prediction markets
might need more help. Here are two more steps, requiring authority
beyond that possessed by OMB, that the government might take in later
years:
* Next two years: If actions by the OMB do not suffice, the
President could order the use of prediction markets by executive
departments and agencies for specified fact-finding purposes.
* Next five years: If growing use by government and private
parties and persuasive reasoning does not suffice to quell doubts
about the legality of real-money prediction markets (especially
those open to the public), litigation, federal regulation, or
legislation might become necessary.
In all likelihood, prediction markets will develop organically and
peacefully, and the sort of legal battles specified in the last step will
never come to pass. Especially once the federal government begins
using prediction markets, they will take their place among such
administrative innovations as record keeping, command hierarchies, and
(to cite a more recent example) wikis. 74 It will become commonplace,
rather than suspiciously novel, for public deliberations to refer to
prediction markets and, far from prosecuting them as gamblers, we will
learn to praise those who grow rich trading on prediction markets as
having earned just rewards for their foresight.
CONCLUSION

Only recently have prediction markets become tools of government
administration. We should expect that trend to continue-and we should
hope that it does. Good government requires good information, after all,

74. See Wiki, WIIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (last visited February 21,
2011) (defining "wiki" as "a website that allows the creation and editing of any number
of interlinked web pages .

.

. typically powered by wiki software and . . . often used to

create collaborative works.").
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and prediction markets can help fill that need. If anyone asks, "Why
should governments use prediction markets?" we might well reply, "Why
not?" We expect civil servants to use phones, organizational charts, and
other cost-effective tools. Given their potential utility, prediction
markets deserve at least a try.
Bureaucrats recoil from legal uncertainty, however, so this paper
has focused on describing and curing the various statutory and regulatory
risks raised by government prediction markets. In sum, this paper
suggested that government agencies should start by contracting out the
administration of prediction markets and by paying employees and select
experts to trade on them. This paper also described the benefits of
structuring a prediction market to host transactions in negotiable
conditional notes, offering traders seed funding, and contractually
mandating a minimum level of trading. This paper concluded with
observations and plans specially suited to the federal executive branch,
the government body most likely to continue developing the
implementation of prediction markets.
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APPENDIX
The Prediction Exchange Protection Act
(Annotated) 75
Section 101. Short Title
This Act may be cited as "The Prediction Exchange Protection
76
Act."
Section 102. FederalPredictionExchange Policy
It is the policy of the United States Government to:
(a)

Promote the general welfare7 7 through the necessary and
proper78 regulation of interstate commerce; 79

(b) Promote the progress of the sciences and useful arts;80
(c)

Encourage the development of private institutions for
resolving questions of science, technology, and public
policy;

(d)

Clarify the legality of qualifying prediction exchanges;

(e)

Employ prediction exchanges to improve the efficiency of
government services.

Section 103. Definitions
(a) A "federally protected prediction exchange" is a forum using
instrumentalities of interstate commerce 8 to facilitate the
buying and selling of prediction notes.
75. For the template for this Act, see "The Scientific Prediction Exchange Act"
proposed at Bell (2006), supra note 23, at 86-87.
76. The term here used to describe the subject markets, "prediction exchange,"
distinguishes the type of prediction market at issue from other types.
77. This phrase borrows language from the Constitution's preamble. U.S. CONST.
pmbl.
78. This phrase confirms that the present Act satisfies the limitations imposed by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
79. This phrase invokes the sole federal power that would appear to justify the
Prediction Exchange Protection Act (PEPA): the Interstate Commerce Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
80. This language harkens back to that of U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 8.
81. That clause establishes the constitutionality of exercising federal legislative
power in this area: as part of the power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONsT. art
I, § 8, cl.3.
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(b) A "prediction note" is a document promising to pay its bearer a
specified amount of money on condition that a designated
prediction judge rules on the document's prediction claim or
claims.
(c) A "prediction claim" is an answer to an unresolved question of
science, technology, or public policy that can be resolved
primarily by the application of skill. A prediction claim is not
an answer to an unresolved question about the outcome of a
sporting event or contest, 82 or the future value of an instrument
currently regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or the future price of an instrument currently
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.84
(d) A "prediction judge" is a person, persons, organization, or entity
designated by a prediction note and authorized, subject to any
limits or requirements specified on that note, to rule on the truth
of the note's prediction.
Section 104. Preemption
(a) No Federal agency, State, political subdivision of a State, or
political authority of two or more States may enact or enforce
any law, regulation, or other provision that has the force or
effect of law and that relates to any prediction exchange under
this title except as otherwise provided in this Section.
(b) No provision of this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter
86
rights and remedies now existing at common law.

82.

That exception assures that no transactions currently outlawed under the Federal

Wire Act or related state laws will win legality under the guise of the Act.
83. That exception assures that the Act does not affect the established authority of
the SEC.
84. That exception assures that the Act does not affect the established authority of
the CFTC.
85. This language largely follows that of the preemption provision in the Federal
Aviation Administration Act of 1994 Pub. L. 103-305 § 601(c), 108 Stat. 1605 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 11501).
86. This savings clause clarifies the scope of the preemption defined in PEPA
§ 104(a) by dint of an expression unius argument: "[W]hen Congress meant to vest
additional regulatory authority in the States it did so explicitly." Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 422 (1986) (concluding thereby
that Mississippi lacked authority to re-regulate gas pipeline transactions deregulated
under federal law).

